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Who	said	that	Germans	have	no	sense	of	irony?
On	5	May,	Germany’s	Constitutional	Court	ruled	that	the	European	Central	Bank’s	Public	Asset
Purchasing	Programme	could	be	incompatible	with	the	German	Constitution.	Waltraud	Schelkle
writes	there	is	a	deep	sense	of	irony	in	the	ruling:	the	German	Court	questions	the	legal	foundations	of
the	ECB’s	independence	but	is	actually	prevented	from	succeeding	by	the	constitutional	fortifications
of	the	ECB’s	independence	on	which	the	German	government	always	insisted.
The	ruling	of	the	German	Constitutional	Court	on	the	ECB’s	bond	purchasing	programme	on	5	May	2020	has	been
largely	received	with	shock,	not	awe.	Even	inside	Germany,	senior	judges	expressed	their	‘horror’	when
contemplating	the	precedent	that	it	sets.	Even	the	usual	critics	have	come	to	the	rescue	of	the	ECB’s	policy
mandate	because	whatever	one	thinks	about	its	lack	of	accountability,	this	is	not	the	issue	here.
The	Federal	Constitutional	Court	(FCC)	ruled	that	the	European	Court	of	Justice	has	not	properly	applied	judicial
reasoning	to	the	FCC’s	request	to	consider	the	legality	of	the	ECB’s	Public	Asset	Purchasing	Programme,	also
known	as	Quantitative	Easing.	Therefore,	the	ECB	must	justify	in	judicial	terms	why	it	had	to	do	Quantitative
Easing.	The	Court	ordered	a	proportionality	test	in	which	the	ECB	should	explain	why	the	detrimental	economic
effects,	for	instance	on	interest	earnings	of	savers,	do	not	outweigh	the	intended	effect	on	price	stability.	If	the	ECB
fails	to	do	this	within	three	months	of	the	ruling,	the	Bundesbank	may	have	to	stop	participating	in	any	further
Quantitative	Easing.
Outside	observers	were	understandably	alarmed	by	the	rejoicing	of	the	claimants,	among	them	inevitably	Peter
Gauweiler	and	Bernd	Lucke	from	the	euro-sceptic	Alternative	für	Deutschland	(AfD):	apparently	they	had	not
expected	such	a	clear	ruling	in	their	favour.	The	right	of	these	claimants	to	bring	this	case	to	a	constitutional	court	is
itself	contested.	Two	of	the	eight	federal	judges	had	argued	in	2014	that	the	complaint	should	have	been	dismissed
by	the	FCC,	as	those	complaining	are	not	individually	affected	and	have	other,	democratic-political,	means	to	make
themselves	heard.	Katharina	Pistor	alleges	that	with	this	ruling	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	(FCC)	expands	its
own	judicial	competence	to	the	point	where	any	German	voter	can	challenge	an	ECB	policy	decision	in	the
Constitutional	Court	if	the	German	parliament	has	not	explicitly	endorsed	it.	And	if	Germany	wants	to	exercise	this
prerogative,	why	not	all	other	18	euro	area	members?	Following	this	logic,	the	ECB	would	have	less	policy
autonomy	than	any	European	central	bank	before	the	introduction	of	the	euro.
But	the	claimants	have	arguably	rejoiced	too	early	and	those	who	laugh	last	may	laugh	longest.	First	of	all,	the
verdict	from	Karlsruhe	did	not	support	the	claimants’	main	challenge	that	the	bond	buying	programme	circumvented
the	prohibition	of	monetary	financing	of	government	budgets.	Bundesbank	President	Weidmann	had	argued	in	an
earlier	hearing	relevant	to	this	bond	purchasing	programme,	in	June	2013,	that	the	ECB’s	Outright	Monetary
Transactions	may	constitute	exactly	such	a	taboo	break.	After	this	Court	ruling,	he	could	be	forced	to	toe	the	line	of
the	ECB	much	more	closely	than	he	did	before,	in	order	to	stay	in	the	game	of	doing	his	job	as	a	central	bank
governor.
Moreover,	the	Court	ruling	challenges	ECB	independence	in	three	ways	but	is	very	unlikely	to	succeed.	First,	the
German	Court	questioned	the	ECB’s	independence	in	choosing	its	policy	instruments.	Bond	buying	or	open	market
policy	is	a	textbook	instrument	of	monetary	policy.	The	Court	acknowledges	that	the	ECB	does	not	buy	bonds
directly	from	issuing	governments,	which	is	the	only	legal	limit	to	the	ECB’s	policy	autonomy.	It	just	has	a	problem
with	the	volume	of	it	that	may	have	not	just	indirect,	but	direct	economic	consequences.	How	the	Court	draws	this
distinction	is	anybody’s	guess	because	well-seasoned	economists	would	find	it	difficult.	The	extraordinary	situation
will	justify	the	extraordinary	volume,	just	as	it	has	done	everywhere	else	(with	diminishing	effect,	it	has	to	be	said).
Second,	the	Court	ruled	that	the	ECB	cannot	primarily	pursue	its	price	stability	mandate,	even	though,	according	to
Article	127(1)	of	the	Treaty,	‘the	primary	objective’	of	the	European	System	of	Central	Banks	(ESCB)	is	to	maintain
price	stability.	As	long	as	this	primary	objective	is	pursued,	the	ESCB	can	support	the	Union’s	general	economic
policies.	We	owe	it	above	all	to	the	German	government	in	the	Maastricht	process	that	these	‘lexicographic
preferences’	are	in	the	ECB’s	statute:	just	as	A	comes	before	B,	so	price	stability	must	come	before	all	other
economic	policies.
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The	European	Court	therefore	applied	only	a	weak	proportionality	test	but	argued	that	the	ECB	has	not	‘manifestly’
impaired	other	economic	policy	goals	with	its	QE	programme.	This	is	extensively	documented	in	the	FCC	ruling	(in
para’s	71-99).	However,	the	German	judges	(para.	136)	now	conclude	that	‘the	necessity	of	interpreting	the	ECB’s
mandate	in	a	restrictive	manner	[..],	given	that	it	de	facto	affords	the	ECB	a	(limited)	competence	to	decide	on	its
own	competences.’	In	other	words,	we	are	no	longer	in	the	world	of	de	jure	but	de	facto	and	it	is	a	German	court
who	draws	the	line.	Should	the	EU	start	an	infringement	action	against	the	German	Court,	as	EU	President	von	der
Leyen	indicated,	the	judges	will	have	to	eat	their	words.
Thirdly,	the	Court	argues	that	if	the	ECB	cannot	show	that	its	bond	purchasing	programme	is	necessary	and
appropriate	to	achieve	price	stability	as	well	as	the	least	intrusive,	it	will	be	acting	ultra	vires	(exceeding	its
competences).	This	would	mean	that	‘the	Bundesbank	may	thus	no	longer	participate	in	the	implementation	and
execution	of	the	ECB	decisions	at	issue’.	The	German	Court	thus	challenges	the	unity	and	hierarchy	of	the
European	System	of	Central	Banks.	It	was,	again,	German	lawmakers	who	insisted	that	national	central	banks
cannot	make	autonomous	decisions.	For	instance,	the	Bank	of	Italy	cannot	refuse	to	participate	in	a	programme	of
monetary	restraint	because	it	fears	unemployment	in	Italy.	How	it	could	be	otherwise	is	the	secret	of	these	lawyers
in	red	robes.
There	is	a	deep	irony	in	this	ruling,	in	the	precise	meaning	of	the	term	as	the	Cambridge	English	Dictionary	defines
it:	‘a	situation	in	which	something	which	was	intended	to	have	a	particular	result	has	the	opposite	or	a	very	different
result.’	The	irony	is	that	the	German	Court	questions	the	legal	foundations	of	the	ECB’s	independence	but	is
actually	prevented	from	succeeding	by	the	constitutional	fortifications	of	the	ECB’s	independence	on	which	the
German	government	always	insisted	(Harold	James	showed	the	latter	in	detail).
The	ECB	cannot	and	must	not	provide	the	proportionality	test	as	set	by	a	German	Court	because	Article	130	of	the
Treaty	does	not	allow	it	to	‘seek	or	take	instructions	from	Union	institutions,	bodies,	offices	or	agencies,	from	any
government	of	a	Member	State	or	from	any	other	body’.	Bundesbank	President	Weidmann	can	choose	to	provide
the	full	justification	of	any	ECB	decision	if	he	likes,	reversing	some	of	his	criticism	of	ECB	policy	in	the	past.	He	can
thank	the	FCC	for	his	predicament.	If	the	FCC	insists,	the	limits	of	its	own	mandate	may	become	apparent,	through
an	infringement	procedure.	The	irony	would	be	complete.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Mehr	Demokratie	(CC	BY-SA	2.0)
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